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Case Comment
The Doctrine of Necessaries & Wisconsin's
Attempt to Modify the Doctrine to Conform
to the Equal Protection Clause
Marshfield Clinic provided medical services to Theodore Discher
for several months prior to his death. The clinic received no payment for
its services. The clinic filed suit against the deceased's widow, Agnes
Discher, for payments for medical services rendered to the deceased. The
clinic did not allege an attempt to collect from the deceased's estate, nor
did it show the estate to be without assets. The trial court dismissed
Marshfield Clinic's complaint on the ground that no cause of action
existed to hold a wife liable for the necessary medical expenses of her
husband.' The Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court to determine whether the clinic made attempts to collect from the
deceased's estate, or whether any collection attempts would have been
futile.2 The court held that the state's common law doctrine of necessaries
as modified in Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff and Estate of
Stromsted4 remained a valid gender classification under the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution.5 Marshfield Clinic v.
Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W. 2d 326 (1982).
The common law doctrine of necessaries allows a wife to purchase
"necessary" items using her husband's credit without his permission if he
has not fulfilled his duty of support.6
In Sharpe Furniture, Inc. and Estate of Stromsted, two cases
decided together in 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court modified the
common law rule to hold wives liable for necessaries along with
1. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 507, 314 N.W. 2d 326, 327 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Marshfield Clinic]. The trial court did not know of the decisions in
Sharpe Furntiture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114,299 N.W.2d 219 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Sharpe], and Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 227 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Stromsted], which altered the common law doctrine by imposing
liability on wives for necessaries.
2. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982).
3. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980).
4. Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 227 (1980).
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
6. Warner & Ryan v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517, 519 (1871) [hereinafter cited as Warner &
Ryan]. See text accompanying notes 13-20.
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husbands. The court, however, placed primary liability on husbands;
wives were secondarily liable.7 InMarshfield Clinic, the court reiterated
its holding in Sharpe that modern society still needs the necessaries
doctrine.8 The court acknowledged, however, that the United States
Supreme Court's equal protection rulings regarding gender classifi-
cations demanded that husbands not bear sole liability for necessaries.
The court considered several possible modifications to the common law
doctrine, but found the best alternative to be the gender based rule of the
Sharpe and Stromsted cases.9 The court decided that placing primary
liability on husbands and secondary liability on wives best balanced the
economic position of women in present day society.' 0 creditors' interests,
and the objectives of Wisconsin's neutral support law."
On a record "almost totally devoid of facts,"' 2 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found its modified common law doctrine of necessaries
constitutional under the equal protection clause. This Comment exa-
mines the Wisconsin Supreme Court's justification for upholding a
gender based rule in light of the United States Supreme Court's standard
for gender discrimination. It contrasts the Court's Marshfield Clinic rule
with the traditional rationales underlying the common law doctrine and
suggests that a case by case approach is a better alternative to the
Wisconsin court's inflexible rule.
The Common Law Doctrine of Necessaries
The common law doctrine of necessaries developed as a wife's
remedy for enforcing her husband's duty of support.II Under the early
English common law, when a man and woman married, the legal identity
7. Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 144-46. 299 N.W.2d at 230-31.
8. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d at 119. 299 N.W.2d at 222.
9. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 513-14, 314 N. W.2d at 330.
10. "Although many more married women are now working than were in the past. they
still contribute less to the typical family income than do their husbands." Id. at 511. 314
N.W.2d at 329. The court cites labor statistics from Monthly Labor Rerieu" to support this
assertion. See text accompanying notes 104-08.
11. Wisconsin's support law reads:
(1) If either spouse fails or refuses . .. to provide for the support and
maintenance of the other spouse ... . the other spouse may commence
an action in any court having jurisdiction in actions for divorce to compel the
spouse to provide such support and maintenance as may be legally
required . ..
Wis. Stat. § 767.08(1) (1981).
12. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 508, 314 N.W.2d at 327.
13. H. Clark. Domestic Relations. § 6.3 (1968): Paulsen. Support Rights and Duties
Between Husband and Wif,. 9 Vand. L Rev. 709, 735 (1956). See also 41 Am. Jur. 2d.
Husband and Wife § § 329-34, 348-70 (1968).
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of the wife merged into that of her husband. ' The United States Supreme
Court noted in 1910:
At common law, the husband and wife were regarded as one,-the
legal existence of the wife during coverture being merged in that of
the husband; and, generally speaking, the wife was incapable of
making contracts or acquiring property or disposing of the same
without the husband's consent."
The doctrine developed in the United States at a time when most
husbands were wage earners and most wives contributed to the marriage
by working in the home.' 6 A husband had a duty to support his wife by
providing for her needs." If a husband neglected his duty of support, his
wife's remedy was to go to the local merchant and pledge her husband's
credit to buy "necessary" items."8 The husband would be liable for the
"necessaries."' 9 In 1871, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first made the
doctrine part of the state's common law:
The husband is under legal obligations to support his wife, and
nothing but wrongful conduct on her part can free him from such
14. Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and Wife's Duty to Render
Services, 29 Va. L Rev. 857, 858-60 (1943). See also 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The
History of the English Law 399-405 (2d ed. 1899).
15. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,614-15 (1910). As one commentator wrote:
"In the English common law the wife was, in economic relationship to the husband, his
property. . . .The financial plan of marriage law was founded upon the economic
relationship of owner and property." Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L Rev. 28, 28-29
(1935).
16. Sayre, supra note 14, at 862-63.
17. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 709-10.
18. The term obviously included food, clothing, and shelter required by the wife:
but it is much broader than this. . . .A necessary is something needed
rather than merely desired by the wife; but what she needs is dependent to
some extent upon what she has become accustomed to, and what her
husband may reasonably be expected to supply.
Brown, Duty of Husband to Support Wife, 18 Va. L Rev. 823,830-31 (1932). Thus, it has
been held that a fur coat is a necessary. Jordan Marsh v. Hedler, 238 Mass. 43, 130 N.E. 669
(1921). The term necessaries takes into account a family's socio-economic status and
lifestyle: "that is to say, those things might properly be deemed necessaries in the family of a
man of generous income or ample fortune which would not be required in the family of a man
whose earnings were small and saved nothing." De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N.Y. 460,
464, 96 N.E. 722,723 (1911). Medical services are necessary expenses. Luther Hospital v.
Garborg, 71 Wis. 2d 460, 238 N.W.2d 529 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Luther
Hospital].
19. The remedy stems from the marriage relationship and is quasi-contractual "[ljt is
an obligation imposed by law without, and usually against, the husband's consent." Brown,
supra note 18, at 827. The duty does not arise out of a wife acting as agent for her husband.
Thus, husbands cannot relieve themselves of liability for necessaries by giving notice to
merchants that the wife is not acting for the husband. As long as the husband has the duty to
support his wife, he must pay for the necessaries she purchases. Id., at 827-28.
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obligations. If he fails to provide her with suitable and proper
necessaries, any third person who does provide her therewith, may
maintain an action against him for the same."0
In practice, the doctrine of necessaries proved a difficult remedy."
The doctrine placed the burdens of proof on the merchant. The merchant
needed to show the item purchased was a "necessary" item.2 This could
involve a protracted inquiry into the family's financial background.23 The
merchant also had to show the husband had not already provided the
item. 24 Merchants were reluctant to extend wives credit in spite of the
20. Warner& Ryan, 28 Wis. at 519 (1871) (citing 1 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce §
553 (4th ed. 1864) ).
21. The courts often left the standard of living up to the husband's discretion: "His
niggardliness gives her no cause of action, and he is entitled to almost unbounded discretion
as to expenditures and style of living." Crozier, supra note 15, at 33-34.
One of the oft.cited examples of "niggardliness" by a husband to his wife is McGuire
v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226,59 N.W.2d 336 (1953). The couple had been married 33 years.
The wife worked as a housewife and raised chickens on the farm until the time of the suit,
when, because of illness, she could no longer do the labor. The husband had over $115,000
in bonds and certificates, yet maintained the home frugally.
From the beginning of married life of the parties the defendant supplied only
the barest necessities and there was no change thereafter. He did not even
buy groceries until the last 3-4 years before the trial, and neither did he buy
clothes for the plaintiff.
Id. at 240, 59 N.W.2d at 343 (Yeager, J., dissenting). The house had no kitchen sink,
bathroom, bathing facilities or inside toilet. It was heated by coal furnace for which the wife
did the scooping. The lower court gave judgment for the wife, allowing her to use her
husband's credit to buy furniture and appliances and make improvements and repairs on
the house. Alternatively the husband "was permitted, in agreement with plaintiff, to
purchase a modern home elsewhere." Id. at 227, 59 N.W.2d at 336-37. The husband was
ordered to buy a new car and to pay the wife $50 a month as a personal allowance. The
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court, saying in part:
The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and
not for the courts to determine, even though the husband's attitude toward
his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said in
his behalf. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as
husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his
wife and the purpose of the marriage relation is being carried Out.
Id. at 238, 59 N.W.2d at 342.
22. Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 196 N.W. 783 (1924) [here-
inafter, cited as Simpson] In Simpson, the court gave the requirements for showing
that items were necessaries: (1) that the items fit the "family's social position in the
community in which they live, and in view of the [husband's] financial ability to pay for
them, and (2) that the articles sold were reasonably needed by the wife or member of the
family . . . at the time of the sale." Id. at 509-10, 196 N.W. at 784.
23. "Had there been a dispute as to his annual income or annual household expenses,
proof of other necessary household expenses would have been admissible upon the question
of his financial ability to pay for necessaries of the quality bought." Id.
24. The husband need only pay for the items once. If the husband has already supplied
the articles or supplied the wife with the money to purchase the articles, he has fulfilled his




husbands' liability under the doctrine.2"
Despite these problems, the doctrine benefits families and credi-
tors. The doctrine is still a remedy for needy wives:
In a credit-oriented society, the most important single aspect of a
wife's financial rights during marriage is the ability to obtain credit.
Through the use of credit, she may effectively enforce her husband's
duty to support-which is otherwise totally unenforceable-by
purchasing needed items and deferring payment for them, or
obtaining unsecured loans to make such purchases.
2
'
The expanded concept of what constitutes a necessary27 allows wives to
purchase items beyond what is "necessary" to live. More than providing a
remedy for failure to provide living necessities, the doctrine allows wives
a form of control over their husbands' income. A wife may purchase items
which would be considered "necessaries" in light of her husband's
income and the family's socio-economic status in the community. 28
Although a wife may not directly handle her husband's income, she may
direct the income by purchasing items for the family on her husband's
credit. In Sharpe2 9 the wife purchased a sofa for which her husband
refused to pay. The Wisconsin court held that the item met the
requirements of a necessary.30 In Wisconsin where a wife has no direct
control over her husband's income," the doctrine of necessaries provides
her with indirect controL3
The doctrine of necessaries allows wives to obtain credit for
necessaries. In separate property states, the ability of wives without assets
to obtain credit is severely limited. A wife without assets will not be able to
obtain credit based on her own creditworthiness; rather, credit will only
25. H. Clark, supra note 13, at 192.
26. Bingaman, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on Married Women's
Financial Individual Rights, 3 Pepperdine L Rev. 26, 29 (1975).
27. See supra note 18.
28. Need is still a factor, but the doctrine in Wisconsin qualifies need to mean what is
"reasonably needed." Simpson, 182 Wis. at 510, 196 N.W. at 784.
29. Sharp 99 Wis. 2d 114,299 N.W.2d 219 (1980).
30. [W] e are satisfied that ample evidence supported the trial court's conclusion
that the Henredon sofa was a legally necessary item. The Buckstaffls are a
prominent family and their socio-economic standing justifies a finding that
the sofa at issue here was a suitable and proper item for their household. With
reference to the element of reasonable need, we note that the sofa has been in
use in the Buckstaff home since its delivery. Such continued use gives rise to
an inference of reasonable need.
Id. at 123, 299 N.W.2d at 224.
31. Rasmussen v. Oshkosh Savings and Loan Association, 35 Wis. 2d 605,151 N.W.2d
730 (1967). See text accompanying notes 126-29.
32. Bingaman, supra note 26, at 29. Although such control is dependent on the court's
discretion, the Wisconsin court gave a liberal interpretation to "reasonable need." Sharpe,
99 Wis. 2d at 123, 299 N.W.2d at 224.
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be extended based on her husband's creditworthiness. 33 Normally, such
credit transactions require the husband's signature, making him, not her,
liable.3 ' In some retail transactions, however, merchants will allow wives
credit: "[R]etail merchants, . .. under certain circumstances, will
open accounts for the wife alone for the purchase of 'necessaries.' ""
Even when spouses agree on the purchase of an item, circumstances may
prohibit a husband's presence at a credit transaction. The doctrine
enables the wife to make retail credit transactions without her husband's
presence.
The doctrine especially benefits needy wives in pre-divorce
situations. The doctrine of necessaries remains in effect as long as the
husband has the duty of support. 36 In situations where the husband and
.wife have separated and are awaiting a divorce decree, the duty of support
remains in effect.3" A wife without marketable skills will need her
husband's support until she can adequately supply her own needs. In pre-
divorce situations, husbands and wives may feel bitter toward each other
and a husband may withhold support payments. The doctrine provides a
wife in this situation with relief from her husband's neglect.'s
Creditors benefit from the doctrine, also. In cases of emergency
33. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1691-1691 (f) (1976), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status in the extension of credit. 15 U.S.C. §
1691(a)(1) (1976). The regulations specifically provide that:
[A] creditor shall not require the signature of an applicant's spouse or other
person, other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument if the applicant
qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the amount
and terms of the credit requested.
12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) (1982).
Discrimination does not include inquiring into an applicant's marital status.
however, "if such inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the creditor's rights and
remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit and not to discriminate in a
determination of creditworthiness .... .. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(1) (1976).
A creditor is permitted to get information about an applicant's spouse if:
(i) The spouse will be permitted to use the account: or
(ii) The spouse will be contractually liable upon the account; or
(iii) The applicant is relying on the spouse's income as a basis for repayment
of the credit requested; ....
12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2) (1982).
The Act prohibits creditors from taking marital status into account if the applicant is
creditworthy by herself/himself. The Act does not make the necessaries doctrine useless
because the law allows the applicant to rely on her/his spouse's income and assets for the
extension of credit. Wisconsin specifically incorporates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
into its laws. Wis. Stat. § 422.301 (1979-1980).
34. Bingaman. supra note 26. at 31.
35. Id.





medical care, for example, the doctrine allows hospitals to provide
medical care to wives without waiting for their husbands to arrive to
arrange financing.39 Emergency situations become frustrating and
potentially harmful events if patients must arrange financing before
receiving care. In medical care situations, both families and creditors
benefit.
The roles of husband and wife have changed since the doctrine of
necessaries was first adopted from the English common law.40 Women
participate more as wage earners within the family unit.4 ' Despite the
change in the economic roles of husband and wife, the law has lagged
behind. In many states, family law continues to view the husband as the
wage earner and household head.42 In the last half of the Nineteenth
39. See supra note 18.
40. Several commentators note the changes in family patterns. The"typical" family had
the husband as the family decisionmaker and breadwinner, and the wife as the homemaker.
"The new marriage. American style, has two earners, mutually dependent on their
combined sources of income, the wife earning less than the husband." Glendon, Modern
Marriage Law and its Underlving Assumnptions: The New Marriage and the New
Property, 13 Fam. LQ. 441. 448 (1979). The customary roles of men and women in
marriage are merging: either spouse may determine her/his role in the marriage. Clark, The
New Marriage, 12 Willamette L J. 441.443 (1976) (hereinafter cited as.New Marriage). As
early as 1943, legal commentators noted the trend toward wage earning wives:
The husband's duty to support his wife does not seem to meet the factual
pattern of the present day when, in so many marriages of young people, both
the husband and wife work for separate and independent employers, so that
there is a monetary contribution to the marriage by both husband and wife,
and a mutual obligation on the part of the both of them seems more
accurately descriptive of what actually takes place. Thus a duty by husband
and wife to contribute to the marriage in ways appropriate under the varying
circumstances [for each] becomes a more accurate legal formula for the
present marriage pattern, than do the common law concepts of husband's
duty to support and wife's duty to render services.
Sayre, supra note 14. at 857-58.
41. Husbands and Iives as Earijers: .n .-lnalvsis ojFanzi lv Data. Monthly Lab. Rev.,
Feb. 1981, at 46: Marital and Family Patterns of 'Workers: An Ldate, Monthly Lab. Rev.,
May 1982, at 53.
42. See, e.g., In re Dupont, 19 B.R. 605 (1982) (interpreting the New York necessaries
doctrine as following the old common law of placing the liability for necessaries solely on the
husband).
JH] owever liberal the western world may think itself to be. and may indeed
be with respect to the general social position of women, it remains true that
there is more straight feudalism in the law of husband and wife in modern
American Law. through the common law. than perhaps in any non-common
law country. To put it bluntly. we are backward in this matter. and a
reconsideration of our technique seems reasonable.
Sayre, supra note 14, at 859. Although this was written in 1943, there is still a great need to
modernize family law. As the lone dissenter, Judge Abrahamson, points out in larshfield
Clinic, the Wisconsin Supreme Court created a cause of action against a wife where none
existed before, yet did not change a 1967 ruling that -'the female homemaker has no rights,
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Century and the first few decades of the Twentieth Century, states
legislated reforms attempting to give wives equal status in marriage with
their husbands.4 3 These reforms, however, generally did not relieve
husbands of their independent duty of support or liability for necessaries.
For example, Married Women Acts gave women the right to contract and
to own property separate from their husbands' control." These acts,
however, did not make wives liable for any financial contribution they
made to the family income and, thus, did not relieve husbands of their
independent duty to support their wives."' Family Expense Statutes
appeared to make both husbands and wives responsible for family
expenses. But most of these statutes did not place personal liability on the
wife. Rather, a wife's property became liable for family necessaries. To
the extent the wife had no property, she had no liability.46 Moreover, any
loss to the wife was temporary. The husband still bore the ultimate duty of
support and the wife could receive reimbursement from him for any loss
she suffered.47 In reality, these reforms did not change the husband's
independent duty of support.
In a few states, legislative action did result in placing liability for
necessaries on wives as well as husbands. Statutes placed liability on
wives for necessaries when the husband was unable to support the
even secondary, to determine how the earnings of the husband shall be spent." 105 Wis. 2d
at 531, 314 N.W.2d at 338 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
Under the influence of State Equal Rights Amendments and of recent
decisions under the Equal Protection Clause . . . duties of support are no
longer imposed upon the husband, but are shared by both husband and wife
to the extent of their abilities, which means that in practice it is impossible to
determine the extent of those duties until litigation defines them.
New Marriage, supra note 40, at 450.
Today, for the first time, large numbers of persons are aware of what only a
few have long known: that the principles developed to protect marriage and
family as an institution are the most sex discriminatory in all of law. When
legal rights and duties are dependent upon the sex of an individual without
regard to the relevance of sex to the objects of those rights and duties, sex
discrimination is being used unjustly as a legal tool This is exactly what the
common law has done with regard to support obligations between husband
and wife.
Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage" The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 Ohio St. LJ. 558 (1974).
43. Clark, supra note 13, at 222.
44. Id.
45. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137,417 A-2d 1003
(1980) [hereinafter cited asJersey Shore]. For a Wisconsin case which holds the same, see
Jewell v. Schmidt, 1 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 83 N.W.2d 487, 491-92 (1957).
46. Crozier, supra note 15, at 35-50; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 42, at 571-
72.
47. Spalding v. Spalding, 361 IlL. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935).
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family.' A few states imposed personal liability on wives in addition to
husbands through Family Expense Statutes.' 9 More recently, states have
imposed reciprocal liability for necessaries upon husband and wife.5 0
Wisconsin followed the trend of reform by amending its support law to
make both husband and wife responsible for the support of the family."'
The state's doctrine of necessaries, however, remained unchanged until
Sharpe and Stromsted modified the rule.
Equal Protection Standard for Gender Discrimination
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court granted broad deference to
legislatures in gender discrimination cases. In equal protection cases, the
Court applied two standards.5 2 The Court used the first standard in
gender discrimination cases. This test was the minimum-scrutiny,
"rational relation" test.53 The "rational relation" test used by the Court
granted broad deference to a legislature's classifications. Although
purporting to require a rational connection between legislative classi-
fications and objectives, the Court upheld classifications if the state
provided even a remote justification.54 The "rational relation" test looked
at the ends desired by the legislature and presumed them constitutionaL."
If the ends were unclear or improper, but the Court could hypothesize a
set of facts which could justify the statute, the Court would uphold the
statute. 6
48. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-201 (1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.110(1981). In Swogger v.
Sunrise Hospital, Inc., 88 Nev. 300, 496 P.2d 751 (1972), the court interpreted §
123.110:
As a general rule, the separate property of the wife is not liable for the debts of
her husband, NRS 123.2 10, nor are her earnings so liable, NRS 123.040.
An exception to that rule appears in NRS 123.110 which provides that "the
wife must support the husband out of her separate property when he has no
separate property and they have no community property and he, from
infirmity, is not able to or competent to support himself." This duty to
support necessarily runs to the benefit of creditors who supply necessaries of
life to the infirm, impecunious husband.
Id. at 301, 496 P.2d at 752.
49. See, e.g., Frost v. Parker, 65 Iowa 178, 21 N.W. 507 (1884); Carson Pirie Scott &
Co. v. Hyde, 39 IlL 2d 433, 235 N.E.2d 643 (1968).
50. See, e.g., Minn. Star. § 519.05 (1981).
51. Wis. Stat. § 767.08(l) (1981). The statute was changed in 1971 from imposing the
obligations of support solely on husbands to imposing obligations on the "spouse." 1971
Wis. Laws, ch. 220, § 4.
52. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L Rev. 1,
8 (1972).
53. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-65 (1961).
54. Gunther, supra note 52, at 21.
55. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (race discrimination).
56. Gunther, supra note 52, at 33.
Law and Inequality
The second standard applied by courts in equal protection cases
involved a "stricter scrutiny." ' The Court under this standard granted
minimal deference to a legislative classification:
[C]lassifications could pass muster only if they were necessary to
implement overwhelming or compelling governmental interests.
Such a test has been applied when the interest being infringed by the
classification itself is regarded as "suspect." The Supreme Court to
date has held that classifications based on race, national origin and
alienage are "suspect.""
The "stricter scrutiny" standard required an intensive look at the
connection between legislative means and ends.
In 1971, with Reed v. Reed,5 9 the Supreme Court began rigorously
examining gender classifications. Without reaching the "stricter scru-
tiny" standard, the Court required that "legislative means . . . sub-
stantially further legislative ends."' 60 The Court no longer gave great
deference to the legislative classification to the extent of creating reasons
for the statute if the legislature could not supply a justifiable purpose.
Rather, the Court focused on the means adopted. The Court required the
legislature to advance an actual purpose related to the means.
6
'
The Court purported to decide Reed under the "rational relation"
57. Id. at 8.
58. Kanowitz, 'Benign'Sex Discrimination" Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 Hastings
L J. 1379, 1382-83 (1980). The Court held race a suspect classification in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). National origin was held a suspect classification in Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Alienage was declared a suspect classification in
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The "strict scrutiny" analysis has also been
applied to legislation infringing on "fundamental rights," for example, the right to vote,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and the right to interstate travel, Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
59. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed involved an Idaho statute which preferred male relatives
as administrators of descendent's estates over female relatives of the same degree of
relations, for example, fathers over mothers. The Court held that the state objective of
reducing the workload of the probate courts, which would have to determine the better
adminstrator by an added hearing, by a mandatory preference of males over females is an
impermissible "arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
at 76. Persons in any of the enumerated classes were similarly situated yet women were
treated differently than men. Id. at 77. Although the Court claimed to be applying the same
standard as before, the "actual intensity of scrutiny was at variance with the articulated
standard." Gunther, supra note 52, at 36.
60. Gunther, supra note 52, at 20.
61. [Such scrutiny] would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative
purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge reasonableness of questionable
means on the basis of materials that are offered to the court, rather than




test while in fact it applied a more rigid scrutiny. The Court formally
articulated the new standard in Craig v. Boren:62 "[C]lassifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 63 The standard
was more rigid than the "rational relation" test, yet not as rigid as the
"strict scrutiny" test. It was an "intermediate" level of scrutiny.
The Court used the "intermediate" standard to overturn gender
classifications in cases like Orr v. Orr.64 In Orr, the Court considered an
Alabama statute65 which stated that husbands, but not wives, may be
required to pay alimony upon divorce. One of the purposes advanced for
the law by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals was the "goal of
compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which
assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working
world following divorce."66 The Court held that the state's compensatory
purpose need not be expressed in a gender based statute. The purpose
could be accomplished as well by a gender neutral statute.
67
62. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Craig].
63. Id. at 197. Craig involved an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under age twenty-one and to females under age eighteen. The state argued, on
the basis of statistics, that the statute enhanced traffic safety. The Court considered the
statistical evidence weak.
Suffice it to say that the showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us
that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking
and driving. In fact, when it is further recognized that Oklahoma's statute
prohibits only the selling of 3.2% beerto young males and not their drinking
the beverage once acquired, the relationships between gender and traffic
safety becomes far too tenuous tosatisfy Reed's requirement that the gender
based difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory
objective.
We hold, therefore, that under Reed, Oklahoma's 3.2% beer statute
invidiously discriminates against males under eighteen-twenty years of
age.
Id. at 204. The Court "openly adopt[ed] for the first time a judicial standard of review based
on intermediate scrutiny .... .. L Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1066 (1978).
64. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Orr].
65. Ala. Code § 30-2-53 (1975). The Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the statute in
Davis v. Davis, 279 Ala. 643,644, 189 So. 2d 158. 160 (1966) ("The statutory scheme is to
provide alimony only in favor of the wife.").
66. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280. The state asserted that its purpose was to reinforce the wife's
role as homemaker. Id. at 279-80. The Court expressly rejected this purpose, saying:" 'No
longer is the female destined solely for the home ana the rearing of the family, and only the
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.' "I d. (quoting Stanton v. Stanton. 421
U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ). The Court acknowledged that "assisting needy spouses" is an
important governmental objective. Id. at 280.
67. Orr, 440 U.S. at 282-83. "A gender based classification which, as compared to a
gender neutral one, generates additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer
cannot survive equal protection scrutiny." Id. The Court followed Orr with Wengler v.
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Under the new intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court upheld
gender based statutes which compensated women for past discrimina-
tion. In Kahn v. Shevin,"6 the Court upheld a Florida statute granting
widows a $500 property tax exemption. Widowers did not receive the tax
benefit. The state objective of "cushioning the financial impact of spousal
loss upon the sex for which the loss imposes a disproportionately heavy
burden"69 was held to be constitutionally sound. In Schlesinger v.
Ballard,70 the Court upheld a statute which automatically dismissed a
male naval officer who had been passed over for promotion twice, while
women were discharged only after serving thirteen years without a
promotion. The Court reasoned that male naval officers had greater
opportunity for promotion through service at sea or participation in
combat, opportunities denied female officers. Congress could con-
stitutionally mandate different rules for discharge because male and
female naval officers were not similarly situated.
71
In certain situations, the U.S. Supreme Court will uphold a gender
classification which serves "important governmental objectives."" It has
permitted gender classifications in some cases to compensate women for
Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), in which the Court held
unconstitutional a Missouri worker's compensation statute which automatically granted
widows death benefits but required widowers to prove their dependence on their wives'
earnings or their mental or physical incapacity. The Missouri Supreme Court, in upholding
the statute, presumed widows to be more in need of compensation than widowers. The U.S.
Supreme Court held the state did not meet its burden ofjustifying the gender discrimination.
Further, the state presented no evidence as to how a gender neutral statute would compare
with a gender based one. 446 U.S. at 151-52.
68. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
69. Kahn [hereinafter cited as Kahn], 416 U.S. at 355. The Court rationalized that
"financial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed
those facing the man. . . . While the widower can usually continue in the occupation
which preceded his spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which,.because of her former
economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer." Id. at 353.
70. 419 U.S. 498 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Schlesinger].
71. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508. In 1981, the Court upheld two gender classification
statutes while overturning one statute. The Court upheld California's statutory rape law
which made men criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse with minor females, even
though California has no similar law making women criminally liable for the act of sexual
intercourse with minor males. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S
464 (1981). In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the Court held the Military
Selective Service Act constitutional. This Act authorized the President to require
registration of males but not females for potential conscription including possible combat
duty. The Court overturned a Louisiana statute which allowed husbands to dispose of jointly
held property without their wife's consent in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981).
72. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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past discrimination." Nevertheless, the compensatory statute must be
based on a legitimate gender dissimilarity requiring compensatory
action.74
Jurisdictions Which Have Imposed Liability on Wives
Under the Common Law Doctrine of Necessaries
Since the U.S. Supreme Court applied the "intermediate scrutiny"
standard to gender classifications, several courts have modified the
common law doctrine to impose liability for necessaries on wives as well
as husbands." Of these courts, the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and
New Jersey concluded that under the equal protection clause it was
improper to impose liability solely on the husband for necessaries.76
Courts have used three different variations of the common law doctrine in
placing liability on wives.
In Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Baum," the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held wives equally liable with husbands for
family necessaries. Relying on Orrv. Orr,7s the New Jersey court held the
73. "Benign" sex discrimination purportedly compensates women for past discrimi-
nation by presently granting women benefits which are withheld from men. Kanowitz.
supra note 58, at 1384.
74. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508.
75. Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136,299 N.W.2d 227 (1980);Jersey Shore. 84 N.J. 137,417
A.2d 1003 (1980); Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So.2d 1356 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Manatee Convalescent Center. Inc.]: Memorial
Hospital v. Habaj, 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorial
Hospitall. The Maryland Court of Appeals eliminated the doctrine of necessaries in
Condore v. Prince George County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981). relying on the
Maryland equal rights amendment rather than the equal protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The court reasoned the state constitution would allow the court to either
"equalize the burdens as between husbands and wives" or eliminate "the necessaries
doctrine in its entirety." 289 Md. at 533, 425 A.2d at 1019. Because the expansion of the
doctrine resulted in the creation of a cause of action against the wife, the court decided to
leave the creation of a cause of action to the legislature. 289 Md. at 530-32, 425 A.2d at
1018-19. The dissent argued for the expansion of the doctrine to wives and acknowledged
"the interest against extinguishing a remedy for support which other courts have concluded
should be retained." 289 Md. at 552, 425 A.2d at 1029 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
76. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 511,314 N.W.2d at329;Jersev Shore. 84 N.J. at
141, 146-51, 417 A.2d at 1005, 1008-10. In Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc., the
Florida District Court of Appeal relied on the Florida legislature's passage of reciprocal
duties of support and maintenance statutes to imply a "'sex-neutral burden of sup.
port.... " 392 So. 2d at 1357. In Memorial Hospital, the Indiana Court of Appeals
recognized the changing role of women and fashioned a gender neutral doctrine of
necessaries which expressed the current status of women and the court's partnership view of
marriage. 430 N.E.2d at 415-16.
77. Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A. 2d 1003 (1980) (a hospital sued a widow for
$25,000 in necessary hospital and medical expenses of the deceased husband).
78. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
Law and Inequality
common law doctrine of necessaries unconstitutional because it dis-
advantages husbands."9 The New Jersey court adopted the reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court:
The basis of the decision in Orr was that the female is no longer
"destined solely for the home and rearing of the family, and only the
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas".... .In holding
that the alimony statute violated equal protection, the Court rejected
the"old notion" that the man is solely responsible to provide a home
and its essentials. Although our focus is not on a statute, but a
common law rule, the same reasoning that led to invalidation of an
alimony statute in Orr now requires modification of the common law
rule to achieve a fairer distribution of the cost of necessaries
incurred by either spouse in the course of their marriage.80
The court adopted a partnership view of marriage.8' Both spouses are
liable for the necessary expenses of the family. The marriage partners can
determine for themselves which spouse is to pay their debts. The court felt
this view conforms to the reasonable expectations of the marital partners
and their creditors in that the resources of both spouses will be available
for family expenses."2
The New Jersey court, however, did not impose unqualified
liability on both spouses. The court expressed concern that, absent
agreement, holding one spouse liable for the other's debts would be too
harsh. The court reasoned:
[I] n the absence of an agreement, the income and property of one
spouse should not be exposed to satisfy a debt incurred by the other
spouse unless the assets of the spouse who incurred the debt are
insufficient.' 3
Therefore, the court held that creditors must first seek payment from the
spouse who incurred the debt before attempting to collect from the other
spouse. 4 This provides some protection to spouses who have not
expressly consented to the debt."5 The rule also benefits creditors.
Creditors who have the foresight to contract for recovery against both
spouses maintain their advantage over creditors who do not so
contract. 86
79. Jersey Shore. 84 N.J. at 146-47, 417 A. 2d at 1008.
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 151, 417 A.2d at 1010.
82. Id.
83. Id See also id. at 149. 417 A.2d at 1009 (-Neither equity nor reality justifies
imposing unqualified liability on one spouse for the debts of the other or exempting one
spouse from the liability for the necessary expenses of the other.-).
84. Id. at 151, 417 A.2d at 1010.
85. Id. This is the rule followed by the Indiana court in Memorial Hospital. 430 N. E. 2d
at 416.
86. Jersey Shore. 84 N.J. at 151. 417 A.2d at 1010.
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The New Jersey court fashioned a gender neutral rule which
weakened the primary policy of the doctrine of necessaries. It debilitated
the protection of needy spouses by placing primary liability on the spouse
who incurs the debt. For example, a wife who is a homemaker, having no
income or assets, may purchase necessaries by pledging the family's
credit. The primary liability, however, remains with her rather than with
her income-producing spouse. Under the old common law doctrine, it was
the failure of the husband, who had the duty of support, to provide the
necessary items to his wife which allowed the needy wife to purchase
necessaries by pledging her husband's credit. Under the New Jersey rule,
the failure of the income-producing spouse to provide support to the other
spouse results only in secondary liability. The dependent spouse is
primarily liable. The New Jersey rule benefits creditors more than needy
spouses.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court modified the common law rule in
Sharpe"' and Stromsted,81 two cases decided the same day. In Sharpe, 9
the court held the common law doctrine of necessaries played a vital role
in modern society. The rule "encouraged the extension of credit to those
who in an individual capacity may not have the ability to make . . .
basic purchases." '9 The court held that a husband remains liable for
necessaries furnished the wife.91 The issue of a wife's liability for family
necessaries arose in Stromsted.92 The Stromsted court noted that the
87. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980).
88. Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 227 (1980).
89. In Sharpe, a retail furniture store allowed a wife to purchase a sofa on credit. When no
payment was made, the furniture company brought suit to recover against both the husband
and wife. The Wisconsin court followed the rationale that the doctrine of necessaries is
imposed "by virtue of the legal relationship of marriage. It arises as an obligation placed on
[the husband] as a matter of public policy.- 99 Wis. 2d at 118. 229 N. W.2d at 221-22. The
court rejects the theory of a wife acting as the agent of her husband as the basis of the
doctrine. For further discussion of the agency issue, see Paulsen, supra note 13. at 713.
735.
90. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d at 119, 299 N.W.2d at 222.
91. This case involved the situation for which the doctrine of necessaries was created.
The court imposed primary liability on the husband and left the issue of a wife's obligation
for Stromsted. According to the concurring opinion in Sharpe, the same result would have
been reached under thecommon law, the new rule of the Wisconsin court underSharpe and
Stromsted, and a gender neutral case by case approach. The concurring judge preferred to
leave any modification of the old common law rule to a fact situation which would have
conflicted with the common law. Sharpe. 99 Wis. 2d at 124-25. 299 N.W.2d at 224-25
(Abrahamson, J., concurring). Such a conflict occurred in Marshfield Clinic.
92. In Stronsted, a hospital filed suit against the estate of a woman for medical services
received by her. The wife's estate argued the husband was liable under the doctrine of
necessaries. The hospital argued that it had a contractual agreement with the wife. A wife is
free to contract under Wisconsin law. Wis. Stat. § 766.15 (1981). Had there been an
express or"implied-in-fact" contract with the wife, the husband would not have been liable.
Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 143-46,299 N.W.2d at 230-31. The dissent in Marshfield Clinic
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gender neutral Wisconsin support law requires wives to share with their
husbands the legal duty to support the family.9 The court reasoned that
this duty extends to liability for family necessaries. On the basis of the
neutral support statute, the court held the wife liable for family
necessaries "in a manner similar" to a husband.
94
The court, however, limited the liability imposed on wives. The
liability for family necessaries lay primarily with the husband and
secondarily with the wife. 9" Labor statistics indicate married women, as a
group, account for only twenty-six percent of a family's income."
Because wives account for a smaller percentage of family income, the
court imposed on them a lesser responsibility to pay for family
necessaries:
We therefore deem it appropriate to fix the quasi-contractual
obligation for necessaries in light of the general income-producing
patterns of the contemporary family. We note that during the past
five years, although married women have made substantial gains in
the labor force, as a general matter they remain behind their
marriage partners as an income-producing element of the family.
The husband, as the typically principal income-producer of the
family, must be viewed as having primary liability for the neces-
saries of his household.9'
The court found the division of liability between husband and wife
mandated by economic reality.
A Florida court ordered the least complicated modification of the
doctrine in Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald.9 The
court held a wife liable for the necessary medical expenses of her
husband.99 The court noted the Florida legislature's "movement . . .
points to the contractual relationship as a factor in determining liability under a gender
neutral case by case analysis. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 522, 314 N.W.2d at 334
(Abrahamson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
93. Stromsted. 99 Wis. 2d at 143-44, 299 N.W.2d at 230. Wis. Stat. § 767.08
(1981).
94. Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 143,299 N.W.2d at 230.
95. Id., 99 Wis. 2d at 144, 299 N.W.2d at 230.
96. Id., 99 Wis. 2d at 145,299 N.W.2d at 230-31 n.7 (citingLaborForce Participation
of Married Women, Monthly Lab. Rev.. June 1977, at 33, and information obtained
independently from the Office of Special Labor Force Studies, Bureau of Statistics. Dep't of
Labor. Washington, D.C.).
97. Stromsted. 99 Wis. 2d at 144-45, 299 N.W.2d at 230-31.
98. Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc.. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).




toward equality of the sexes. This has been notable in the area of
maintenance and support, traditionally seen as a duty only of the male
partner to the marital contract."'10 The Florida court expressly left open
the question of how liability should be apportioned; the court simply
ordered the doctrine enforced against wives as under the common law it
was enforced against husbands. 01 The Florida approach maintains
flexibility. The court has the family's entire assets before it instead of just
the husband's. The court may apportion the liability according to the
family resources, and its own sense of justice. The court can directly order
the wage earning spouse to pay the debt.
The Marshfield Clinic Court's Analysis
The only issue that the court in Marshfield Clinic decided was the
constitutionality of the modified doctrine of necessaries under the equal
protection clause.1" ' The court held that the common law rule of
necessaries as modified in Sharpe and Stromsted satisfied the "inter-
mediate scrutiny" test and was constitutional.0 3 The court emphasized
two governmental objectives served by the modified doctrine. The first
objective focused on benefits to families. Families benefited by obtaining
credit for necessary items more easily. A wife may obtain necessaries
without her husband's presence to verify her creditworthiness.0 4 Fur-
ther, the modified doctrine of Marshfield Clinic protects wives
from economic hardship by placing primary liability on husbands.
This is significant because . ..wives have made substantial
economic gains in the past decade, but substantial economic
disparities still persist between husbands and wives."'
As it did in Stronsted, the court relied heavily on labor statistics to justify
placing primary liability on husbands. The court cited statistics which
reported that only about one-half of all wives work outside the home. Of
those working, approximately one-third work part-time.1°6 On the
average, wives earned only about one-quarter of a family's income.' 01 The
court found that these statistics indicate that the Sharpe and Stromsted
rule is the fairest method of apportioning liability. The rule imposes
100. Id. at 1357.
101. Id. at 1359 n.1.
102. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982).
103. Id. at 509-10, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
104. Id. at 510, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 511-13, 314 N.W.2d at 329-30 (citing Marital and Family Patterns of the
Labor Force, Monthly Lab. Rev. Oct. 1981, at 36-37).
107. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 512,314 N.W.2d at 329 (citing Working Wives'
Contribution to Family Income in 1977, Monthly Lab. Rev., Oct. 1979, at 62-63).
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secondary liability on the wife because the average wife earns a small
fraction of a family's income. 108
The Marshfield Clinic rule places primary liability on husbands
regardless of their economic means. The court finds support for its gender
based rule in "benign" discrimination'0 9 cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court. The Wisconsin court justifies the rule by
recognizing the dissimilar economic position of husbands and wives."a
Relying on the statistics, the court finds the gender based classification
"reflects the demonstrable fact that men and women are not similarly
situated""' with respect to income and earning capacity."' The Wis-
consin court noted that the United States Supreme Court recognized the
job market still favors males despite changing laws, and upheld classi-
fications designed to give women added compensation for unequal
treatment in the past. "3 In Kahn v. Shevin, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a statute which granted benefits to women but not men on
the basis of statistics which indicated a dissimilarity in the economic
position of males and females." 4
The second governmental objective that the doctrine of necessaries
serves is the protection of creditors. The Wisconsin court argued that its
new rule better assures merchants of payment for credit extended to
purchase necessaries."' It preserves judicial resources and creditors'
time. It directs creditors to proceed first against the husband, then "to the
extent that the husband is unable to satisfy his obligation . . . the
creditor may seek satisfaction from the wife.""' 6 Under the new rule,
according to the court, creditors avoid investigating and establishing the
husband's and wife's respective income and earning capacity. Such
evidence would be required under a gender neutral approach to
determine from which spouse the creditor can collect. The Marshfield
Clinic rule requires creditors to seek payment from the husband first. The
court argued that such a fixed rule is "essential in the commercial
world."" 7
The Disadvantages of the Marshfield Clinic Rule
At first glance, the majority's rule seems to propel the common law
108. Marshlield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 513, 314 N.'.2d at 330.
109. See supra note 73.
110. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 516, 314.N.W.2d at 331.
111. Id. at 515, 314 N.W.2d at 331. (citing Schlesinger. 419 U.S. at 508).
112. Id. at 516, 314 N.W.2d at 331.
113. Id. at 515, 314 N.W.2d at 331.
114. Kahn, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1974).
115. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 510, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
116. Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 145, 299 N.W.2d at 231.
117. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 514, 314 N.W.2d at 330.
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doctrine of necessaries into modern society. It appears to provide for
liability for both the husband and wife as required under the equal
protection clause. It reflects economic reality by making wives, who do
not generally contribute as much income to the family as husbands, only
secondarily liable. Finally, creditors know that if they lend money to a
spouse for necessaries, they need not worry which spouse has the
obligation to pay. The creditor is directed to seek satisfaction from the
husband first.
These apparent advantages are of minimal value. The court's
concern for unemployed wives would be better served by a gender neutral
case by case approach which imposes liability based on each spouse's
actual income. Creditors do not save time with theMarshfield Clinic rule.
Creditors must still delve into a family's financial background to prove
that the item purchased is "necessary."
The majority's rule creates a cause of action against wives where
none existed before. The court acknowledged that the equal protection
clause requires imposition of liability on wives.'I" TheMarshfield Clinic
rule, however, imposes liability on wives in some cases where" [t] he court
should not be imposing any liability on [them] at all." 1 9 In families where
the wife is not a wage earner, the court creates a cause of action against her
even though she has no assets to pay the liability. In this situation the
majority's rule diverges from the original rationale of the doctrine. The
common law doctrine was set up to provide a remedy for housewives who
have no assets of their own to purchase necessaries. The Marshfield
Clinic rule imposes a legal obligation to pay for necessary items on the
wife who has no assets and who purchases the necessaries by pledging her
husband's credit.'" In such cases, the wife should be free from liability
because she has no ability to pay.
Practically, the absence of assets shields dependent spouses.
Creditors cannot collect from someone who owns nothing- "[I] n the real
world, the female homemaker may escape liability because a creditor may
tire and give up after suing the husband.""' Nevertheless, the govern-
ment objectives of benefiting creditors can be accomplished without the
imposition of a strict rule of liability.' In Orr v. Orr,23 the United States
118. Id. at 509-10, 514-16, 314 N.W.2d at 328, 330-31.
119. Id. at 530, 314 N.W.2d at 338 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 530-32,314 N.W.2d at 338-39 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Stromsted, 99
Wis. 2d at 149-50, 299 N.W.2d at 233 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
121. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 530, 314 N.W.2d at 338 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
122. The majority reasons that the wife should be secondarily liable because she
,shares with her husband the legal duty of support of the family.' Yet, the law
of support which underpins the doctrine of necessaries is not itself a hard and
fast rule. The statutory duty of support is allocated between the marital
partners on the basis of a number of factors.
Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 149, 299 N.W.2d at 232 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
123. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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Supreme Court held that states cannot discriminate on the basis of sex if a
gender neutral method will achieve the same goals with the same degree of
proficiency. 24 The policies behind the doctrine of necessaries can be
better advanced with a gender neutral case by case approach.
Moreover, even the fact of secondary liability carries with it
disadvantages. The few creditors who choose to obtain judgments against
wives adversely affect the wives' economic future for many years unless
the judgments are discharged. To have the judgments discharged by
judicial decree involves a separate court action. Under a case by case
approach, the court would take into account the financial background of a
husband and wife in determining liability. If the family assets are such
that neither spouse can pay a judgment, a discharge of liability could be
effected at the same proceeding. In cases of medical necessaries, for
instance, the discharge in liability is significant.12
The Wisconsin court created a cause of action against the wife
without providing any reciprocal court action to allow her access to a
family's resources. The dissent recalled the court's decision in
Rasmussen v. Oshkosh Savings and Loan Association126 where the
court held:
The general rule in separate property states in which the husband
and wife may own property separately from the other is that the
excess left after paying the joint expenses of the husband, the wife,
and the family remains the property of the husband, and does not
automatically constitute a gift to the wife.'
The common law in Wisconsin held a husband's wages were his property.
As the dissent commented: "The female homemaker has no rights, even
secondary, to determine how the earnings of the husband shall be
spent. . . . The majority denies the wife control over the 'family income
or assets' but makes her liable for family necessaries."' 2' s A wife is
disadvantaged because although not controlling any of the family's
income, she is potentially liable for the debts of her husband. Further,
because of the husband's control over his earnings, a wife will be liable for
any necessary items she purchases by pledging her husband's credit. The
court has created a creditor's remedy rather than aiding dependent
spouses. 29
124. Id. at 282-83.
125. See, e.g., Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137. 417 A.2d 1003 (1980).
126. 35 Wis. 2d 605, 151 N.W.2d 730 (1967).
127. Id. at 610, 151 N.W.2d at 732.
128. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 531-32, 314 N.W.2d at 338 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
129. The dissent in Stromsted noted that the doctrine "has never been an effective or
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The court's rule benefits only the stereotypical family depicted by
the statistics. The majority believes that the typical family consists of a
husband working full time and a wife contributing at most a small amount
to the family's income. In that situation, the husband is the primary wage
earner and also bears the primary liability for necessaries. The wife is the
secondary wage earner and bears only a secondary liability for neces-
saries. The wife acts as a surety for any obligations remaining unpaid after
the husband's assets have been exhausted. The husband normally pays
for the necessaries. If the family purchases something the husband cannot
afford himself, his wife pays the excess with her wages. This is the
situation envisioned by the rule. The wife has some liability but also some
assets to help cover her liability. The court's typical family, however, is
less in need of the remedy of the doctrine of necessaries because neither
spouse is totally dependent on the other. The wife's income may not be
adequate to cover items considered necessary under the expanded
definition of necessaries. Yet, the wife will not be helpless as she will be
able to purchase the minimally necessary items, like food and
clothing.
In situations where the wife earns as much or more than her
husband, the husband is needlessly disadvantaged by the court's rule. A
wife would have the resources to pay for the necessaries she buys.
Primary liability, however, still remains with the husband. When the wife
is the primary wage earner, the husband is the spouse with fewer
resources. Yet, he still bears primary liability for necessaries. 30 In this
situation, the husband should bear little or no liability. The majority's
rule marginally benefits only the families in which the husband is the
primary wage earner and the wife is the secondary wage earner. In all
other situations, the rule does not conform to the original rationale of the
doctrine. It either benefits the spouse who is not in need of a remedy or
places the primary liability on the spouse who has fewer resources.III
Moreover, placing primary liability on the husband perpetuates the
idea of separate duties. Encouraging set roles inhibits the freedom to
change roles. A husband will be reluctant to take a domestic role if he
satisfactory means of enforcing the right of support and has always, in reality, been more of a
benefit to the creditor than to the needy spouse," 99 Wis. 2d at 150 n.2,299 N.W.2d at 233
n.2 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Nevertheless,
without any knowledge of the financial circumstances of the Stromateds or of
their relation with the creditor ... , the court designates the husband
primarily liable and the wife secondarily liable. It is the creditor's neglect
which is remedied by the court in this case, not the neglect of one marital
partner in the Stromsted marriage to support the family.
Id. at 149, 299 N.W.2d at 232 (Abrahamson. J., dissenting).





knows he will remain liable for necessaries. At an earlier time, a different
rule for each spouse more accurately reflected reality. Family roles were
more often assigned according to sex. Today, family roles are not as firmly
determined by gender. Both men and women can choose to be wage
earners or homemakers. Maintaining a gender based rule changes
nothing. In effect, it perpetuates gender based family roles.
The Case by Case Analysis
In Sharpe, Stromsted and Marshfield Clinic, the lone woman on
the court objected to the imposition of a gender based rule.' 32 Although
Justice Abrahamson agreed that the doctrine of necessaries should be
retained, she disagreed with the majority's rule. She preferred a case by
case analysis.'"
A gender neutral case by case approach would apportion the
liability for necessaries more equitably. A court procedure which
included a determination of the husband's and wife's respective ability to
pay would cause liability to shift to the spouse who was able to pay.
Liability would be placed on the spouse not fulfilling his or her duty of
support. The needy spouse who purchased necessaries would not incur
liability. Further, the liability would be apportioned like the deter-
mination of support under the Wisconsin statute. Under the support
statute, the court views the financial background of both husband and
wife in order to determine which spouse will make support payments.' 34
The liability for necessaries should track the duty of support.
The majority declares such analysis unduly burdensome. The
majority formulates its rule to aid creditors. Creditors are told to seek
payment from the husband first; he bears primary liability. In actual
practice, creditors gain little from the rule. The) must still delve into the
family's financial background to prove the item purchased was a
"necessary.""' Information regarding which spouse earns income is part
of the information required to determine whether the item is a necessary.
For example, in Sharpe,3 6 the court inquired into the husband's job and
132. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d at 123, 299 N.W.2d at 224 (Abrahamson, J., concurring);
Stromsted. 99 Wis. 2d at 146,299 N.W.2d at 231 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Marshfield
Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 517. 314 N.W.2d at 332 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
133. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 532, 314 N.W.2d at 339 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
134. Wis. Stat. § 767.08(1) (1981). A disadvantage of granting the courts discretion to
determine who should make support payments is that it permits them to impose their
attitudes about gender relations on the parties. The only remedy for a dissatisfied party is a
costly appeal Nevertheless. the Wisconsin legislature leaves the determination of who
should make support payments to the court's discretion.
135. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 527, 314 N.W.2d at 336 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
136. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980).
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the socio-economic standing of the family in order to determine whether a
sofa was a necessary.' 7 Since the majority's rule does little to conserve
judicial resources, the court should not impose a gender based rule in
place of a gender neutral approach.
The case by case approach embodies the idea of a partnership
marriage. Both the Wisconsin court and the New Jersey court claimed to
adopt the partnership as the family model.' 38 Yet, both courts adopted
rules that disadvantaged the economically weaker partner either direct-
ly" ' or indirectly.'4 ° In the case by case approach, the spouses are free to
arrange their finances and pay their obligations according to their needs
and desires. One spouse can become the homemaker and can rely on the
other spouse for support. If the spouse does not provide support, the law
will not impose liability upon the spouse with fewer resources for
resorting to the doctrine of necessaries to make up the deficiency. The
spouse with fewer resources is protected. Under a gender neutral case by
case approach, the spouse with fewer resources is not completely exempt
from liability. A spouse is responsible to the family unit for the income
s/he earns. Neither has an advantage over the other. The strict Wisconsin
rule ignores a wife's liability until a husband's assets are exhausted.
Under a case by case approach, both spouses bear liability in relation to
their ability to pay.
The doctrine of necessaries should focus liability on the family, not
on the individuals within the family unit.141 The rule, by assigning a
stereotypical role to each spouse, becomes a legal fiction.' 42 The law
should not assign roles to spouses. Rather, it should fix mutual
obligations according to contribution.'4 3 The family is obliged to pay for
necessaries. The law should allow the family the freedom to be organized
according to the desires of the spouses, yet require that the family unit
meet its legal responsibilities to its members and to others.
137. Id. at 123, 299 N.W.2d at 224.
138. Marsh field Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 531, 314 N.W.2d at 338 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting); Jersev Shore, 84 N.J. at 147, 151, 417 A.2d at 1008, 1010.
139. Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980); see also text accompanying note
86.
140. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982); see also text
accompanying notes 130-31.
141. Sayre, supra note 14, at 875.
142. Krauskopf and Thomas cite a study by Professors Jacobs and Angell in 1928. The
study determined that in more than half of the families, "the spouses acted jointly in
determining important family expenditures. This was true, even though under the law of
New York the wife had no legal right in her husband's earnings, apart from her right of
support". Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 42, at 597 n. 148 (citing Jacobs & Angell, A
Research in Family Law 469 (1930)).




The rule adopted by the Wisconsin court is not an adequate remedy
for dependent spouses. The doctrine of necessaries originated as a
remedy for needy wives to purchase necessaries. Needy wives were wives
who were dependent on their husbands for support. When the support
was withheld, the wife was in need of a remedy. The court's rule benefits
only one type of family, that is, the family in which the husband works full
time and the wife brings in a supplemental income. In this situation, the
spouse with fewer resources is unlikely to be in need of a remedy to
purchase necessaries. Where the family has one completely dependent
spouse, the rule is unsuitable. If the wife is truly dependent, she should
not even bear a secondary liability. If the husband is dependent, then the
primary liability should be on the income-producing wife. The case by
case approach provides a gender neutral, flexible method of supplying a
remedy to dependent spouses for the purchase of necessaries. Because the
doctrine of necessaries is better served with a gender neutral case by case
approach, the Wisconsin rule is an unconstitutional gender classi-
fication.'"
Robert Toews*
144. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283.
Robert Toews is a 1983 graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School.
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